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Abstract 
 
 
Using unexplored Japanese and Swiss public procurement data over 1990-2003, we examine 
the effect of macroeconomic, political economy, procurement-specific and domestic policy 
factors on governments‟ sourcing decisions. We also provide for an empirical test of 
Baldwin's (1970, 1984) "neutrality proposition" and for the effectiveness of the WTO's 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Government Procurement (URGPA) in increasing foreign 
market access. Our results suggest the importance of the magnitude of procurement demand, 
domestic firm attributes and unobserved sector-specific heterogeneity in these governments' 
purchases from abroad. However, the expected impact of traditional macroeconomic variables 
and political budget cycles does not come through in our results. Public and private sector 
imports do not offset each other in our analyses for Japan and only selectively for Switzerland. 
Finally, membership of the URGPA is only found to increase the value of foreign procurement 
in Switzerland, though it seems to increase the import demand for contracts in both countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The rise in total spending by central and local governments was one of the most profound 
economic changes of the twentieth century (Tanzi & Schuknecht, 2000). This also means that, 
in keeping with its significant responsibilities, the government in all its forms spends a 
considerable sum of money on procuring goods and services. The OECD (2002) has estimates 
suggesting that government procurement (including defence and compensation of employees) 
accounts for almost 20% of GDP in OECD countries and between 9 and 20% of GDP in 
developing countries. Thus the state has a huge influence over the allocation of resources in 
market economies through procurement, a prominent aspect of which is the preference for 
domestic over foreign firms in the award of public contracts despite cost and quality 
considerations. This "home-bias" in public purchase decisions has been particularly evident in 
major economies during the recent economic crisis (Evenett, 2009 a, b) and has non-trivial 
efficiency effects especially at a time when most of these governments are confronted with 
binding budget constraints (Schooner & Yukins, 2009). 
 
Evidence in support of this home-bias has been provided in the literature - Mastanduno 
(1991), Hoekman and Mavroidis (1997), Trionfetti (2000), the European Commission (1997), 
Brülhart M. & F. Trionfetti (2001), Evenett and Shingal (2006), Shingal (2011). Literature has 
also evolved to explain this home-bias in public procurement - McAfee and McMillan (1989), 
Laffont and Tirole (1991), Rothenberg (1993), Branco (1994), Breton and Salmon (1995), 
Chen (1995), Vagstad (1995), Naegelen and Mougeot (1998), Weichenrieder (2001). Another 
branch of this literature has looked at corruption and bribery as determinants of the home-bias 
in public procurement - Rose-Ackerman (1975), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Burguet and Perry 
(2000), Burguet and Che (2004), Compte et.al. (2005). However, almost exclusively, this 
literature has focused on the interaction between the tendering entity and the bidding firms in a 
microeconomic setting of asymmetric information and contract theory. 
 
In this paper, we depart from this line of research and consider other factors - procurement-
specific, macroeconomic, political economy and domestic policy - that influence a 
government's propensity to source from foreign suppliers. Review of related literature and 
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anecdotal evidence both suggest the importance of these factors, but to the best of our 
knowledge, this area remains un-researched in the procurement literature.       
 
The impact of political institutions on economic policy has been extensively studied in the 
political budget cycles literature
2
 – Rogoff and Silbert (1988), Persson and Tabellini (1990), 
Rogoff (1990), Alesina et.al. (1997), Diermeier and Merlo (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000), Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Shi and Svensson (2000), Persson 
(2002). This body of literature explores the implications of electoral cycles on the size and 
composition of government spending using signalling and moral hazard models to conclude 
that governments increase spending before elections to enhance their chances of re-election. In 
this paper, we extend this intuition to government procurement – governments are more likely 
to award contracts to domestic firms in an election period since this would improve their 
chances of being re-elected. Our motivation is also drawn from recent literature that looks at 
the effect of political connections on the allocation of procurement contracts (Goldman et.al., 
2009; Hyytinen et.al., 2009) and that studying tenure in office and public procurement 
(Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2010). 
 
Similarly, the impact of macroeconomic variables, especially exchange rate, on trade has been 
studied in the literature (Baldwin, 1988; Baldwin & Krugman, 1989; Campa, 2004), but not on 
public procurement. In this paper, we bridge this gap in research too. Governments are more 
likely to award contracts to domestic firms in a recession to stimulate Keynesian multiplier 
effects in the economy. Similarly, a currency devaluation or depreciation of the exchange rate 
that makes imports more expensive would also make it more cost-effective for governments to 
purchase from domestic firms. On the other hand, an increase in government spending at home 
may result in a depreciation of the real exchange rate (Ravn et. al., 2008). Thus, causality in 
this case may work both ways.  
 
Anecdotal evidence cited in Shingal (2009) also suggests that the home-bias in procurement 
may be driven by a range of procurement-specific and domestic policy factors. These include 
                                                 
2
 An initial review of the theoretical and empirical literature can be found in Alesina et.al. (1997).   
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the nature of the good or service
3
 being procured; the value of the procurement contract
4
; the 
extent of domestic competition
5
; practical considerations of the tender
6
; compliance costs
7
; 
regulatory burden
8
; and the domestic policy environment
9
 (the last three are also discussed in 
some detail by Evenett & Hoekman, 2004). Of these factors, the importance of practical tender 
considerations and compliance costs would diminish in magnitude for foreign firms supplying 
governments abroad via affiliates. 
 
To motivate our analysis, we consider a simple model of government procurement decision-
making used in this literature to illustrate how some of these factors work to the detriment of 
foreign firms. We then empirically examine the importance of these factors using self-
assembled and hitherto unexplored data submitted by Japan and Switzerland to the WTO over 
1990-2003. In doing so, we also provide a ceteris paribus empirical test of Baldwin's (1970, 
1984) "neutrality proposition" by examining if a reduction in imports from the government is 
                                                 
3
 Some goods and services are easily procurable domestically which renders the entire exercise of initiating a 
global tender cumbersome. On the other hand, some goods and services are too specialized for them to be 
available domestically, which mandates their foreign procurement. Moreover, if the structure of production is 
dominated by intermediate inputs, then demand is more likely to be locally-driven, giving rise to a home-bias in 
both consumption and trade (Hillberry & Hummels, 2002) and this may well extend to the domain of public 
procurement (Brenton, 2001). 
4
 The contract value may not be large enough to be economically attractive to foreign suppliers or to warrant a 
global tender, especially in the case of goods procurement.  
5
 A competitive domestic market ensures both availability of suppliers and cost minimization through 
competition. In some cases, however, governments may need to restrict competition to ensure contract 
performance (Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Rothenberg, 1993; Breton and Salmon, 1995). 
6
 Would the tender documentation require translation? Is there enough time to respond to the tender? Such 
considerations also govern the participation decisions of foreign firms besides inflating their costs. 
7
 Breton & Salmon (1995) show that the premium required to ensure contract compliance may increase with the 
number of potential bidders and in such situations minimizing expected procurement costs may require limiting 
the number of potential suppliers. Problems of asymmetric information may also induce procuring entities to 
choose suppliers located within their jurisdictions so as to reduce monitoring costs. Moreover, search costs of 
operating across complex networks of contacts in modern economies are likely to be lower within than between 
countries (Rauch, 1999) while the element of trust required in lowering transaction costs is likely to be higher 
(Fukuyama, 1995). All these factors act to the detriment of foreign firms. 
8
 Cumbersome regulatory requirements can discourage a foreign firm from participating in a bid. For instance, 
the firm may need to be pre-registered with the domestic accreditation body before it can submit a bid. A foreign 
firm may also be faced with more stringent quality requirements compared to domestic firms. A study of such 
regulatory barriers in the EU‟s government procurement market can be found in Khorana and Shingal (2008). It 
would also be useful to remember here that services procurement depends upon the particular sector being first 
scheduled under the GATS; hence, there may already be a range of market access, national treatment and 
regulatory barriers confronting foreign suppliers in services procurement. 
9
 Purchase and price preferences and product reservations in the importing countries systematically discriminate 
against foreign firms. The absence of a domestic bid challenge procedure in the importing country may also 
influence a foreign firm‟s participation decision. On the other hand, economies that are more integrated with the 
rest of the world are also, ceteris paribus, more likely to be open to foreign procurement. 
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compensated by a corresponding increase in the imports of the private sector. Finally, we also 
test for the effectiveness of the WTO's Uruguay Round Agreement on Government 
Procurement (URGPA) in increasing foreign market access in these countries' goods 
procurement market. To the best of our knowledge, these are all original contributions to this 
literature. 
 
The choice of countries in this paper is primarily determined by data availability. Both 
countries have submitted detailed procurement data sufficiently regularly
10
 over 1990-2003 
and in a form amenable to empirical analysis. But there are other considerations as well: both 
are large open economies and have large governments, federal as well as sub-federal.     
 
Across specifications, our empirical results suggest the importance of the magnitude of 
procurement demand and unobserved sector-specific heterogeneity in the public purchase 
patterns of both countries. Foreign procurement is found to vary inversely with domestic firm 
competitiveness and other supply-side controls in Japan in the absence of sector-specific fixed 
effects (SSFE); the opposite is true for Switzerland. However, the expected impact of 
macroeconomic factors and political budget cycles does not come through in our results. 
Public and private sector imports do not offset each other in our analyses for Japan and only 
selectively for Switzerland. Finally, membership of the URGPA is only found to increase 
foreign market access for goods in Switzerland, though it does seem to increase the import 
demand for contracts in both countries. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers a formal treatment of a 
government‟s procurement decision while Section 3 introduces the empirical model used in 
the paper. Section 4 discusses the data used and its limitations for analysis and also conducts a 
preliminary diagnosis. Section 5 discusses relevant estimation issues with Section 6 describing 
results from the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
  
                                                 
10
 Japanese procurement data are missing for 1994-1996, the Swiss for 1992. 
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2.  A simple model of procurement decision-making 
 
Government procurement rules at the WTO require that only contracts above a certain 
threshold
11
 value be subject to internationally competitive bidding (ICB). One way of 
discriminating against foreign firms is by splitting contracts to keep them below such 
thresholds.  
 
More formally, consider a government wishing to purchase a good or service whose value is 
given by V(q,p) where q is the characteristics/quality, p is the expected payment or the price 
vector. Let the “splitting” parameter be w and the preferences to the domestic firms be s where 
sϵ(0,1). Denote the costs of the bidding process by k. 
 
Now in the absence of contract splitting and preferential treatment, a procurement contract is 
subject to ICB if V(q,p) > k; this describes the threshold condition. 
 
Allowing for contract splitting and preferences the threshold condition becomes 
[1-(w+s)].V(q,p) > k 
 
Implication 1: If the preferential treatment is absolute i.e. s=1, then the contract is not subject 
to ICB 
 
Implication 2: As w→1, the contract remains below threshold 
 
                                                 
11
 Thresholds differ depending on the type of procurement and on the level of government making the purchase 
and are stated in terms of the IMF‟s accounting unit, the SDR.  For central government entities, the threshold 
values are SDR 130,000 for procurement of goods and services and SDR 5 million for procurement of 
construction services. For sub-central government entities, the thresholds are SDR 200,000 for goods and 
services, (except for the United States and Canada which apply a SDR 355,000 threshold) and SDR 5 million for 
construction services (with the exception of Japan and the South Korea, which apply a SDR 15 million 
threshold). For utilities, the threshold values are SDR 400,000 for goods and services (with the exception that the 
United States applies a US$ 250,000 threshold for federally owned utilities) and SDR 5 million for construction 
services (barring Japan and Korea, which apply a threshold of SDR 15 million). Additionally, Annexes of 
individual signatories may specify higher thresholds for particular Contracting Parties in a bid to ensure 
reciprocity. 
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Another way of discriminating against foreign firms is to award fewer of the above-threshold 
contracts to foreign suppliers. Let the cost of producing the procured good or service for the 
domestic and foreign firm be cd(q) and cf(q), respectively with cf(.)<cd(.) by assumption. Let 
factors increasing the cost of participation for foreign suppliers relative to domestic suppliers 
be denoted by z(V(.)) and the government‟s corruption propensity by m.  
 
Then, expected profit of the domestic firm, πd = p – [cd(q) + m(V(.))], and expected profit of 
the foreign firm, πf = p – [cf(q) + z(V(.)) + m(V(.))]. Thus, even if cf(.)<cd(.), πf<πd if 
z(V(.))>(cd-cf). The foreign firm may therefore decide not to participate in the bidding process 
itself, which is an illustration of how the home-bias works. 
 
Similarly, the government‟s objective is to maximize the expected value of [V(q,p) – p], 
which is equivalent to minimizing the expected payment as each bidder will choose the cost 
minimizing quality. Now, p = f(bd,bf) where bd, bf are the bid prices of the domestic and 
foreign firm, respectively, and bd = g(cd(.)) and bf = h[(cf(.), z(V(.))]. Even in the absence of 
z(v(.)), McAfee & McMillan (1989) and Branco (1994) have shown that the optimal 
procurement policy implies that the contract be awarded to the domestic firm. With 
z(V(.))>(cd-cf), minimizing expected payment would necessarily imply that the government 
award the contract to the domestic firm.   
    
3.  Empirical model  
 
Ideally, the empirical estimation would entail a two-stage Heckman selection model, where 
stage one would estimate whether (or not) a procuring entity put a contract above threshold 
and stage two would estimate the share of the above-threshold contracts that was awarded to 
foreign suppliers. Unfortunately, available government procurement data meet the 
requirements of stage two analysis only; data required for stage one analysis are not required 
by the URGPA to be reported at the level of the individual goods and services.    
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The empirical analysis in this paper therefore only focuses on stage two. The determinants of 
foreign procurement discussed in the preceding sections are the explanatory variables used in 
our empirical model. The functional form and specification of the model are in the spirit of the 
standard import demand function of the following form: 
 
ln MDit = a0 + a1ln (PMi/PDi)t + a2lnYit + Uit , 
 
where MDit is the value of imports of country “i" at time “t”, PM is the unit value of imports, 
PD is the domestic price level, Y is the real GNP, and Uit is an error term associated with each 
observation. 
 
However, we do not pool data for Japan and Switzerland in one panel as these countries are 
sufficiently different to warrant this
12
. Moreover, data availability constraints, discussed in 
detail in the following section, imply that doing so would lead to biased results. We therefore 
set up the data in separate panels for Japan and Switzerland to gain information from both the 
variation in time and that across categories of goods and services that are procured by the 
governments of these two countries. The empirical model has the following baseline 
specification:  
 
FPVkt = α + β1RDN
13
kt + β2APLkt + β3Xkt + β4XDkt +β5N
14
kt + β6TAR
15
kt + β7Mkt + β8ROGt + 
β9REER
16
t + β10ELECt + β11 ELECt-1 + β12URGPA
17
t + µkt 
 
                                                 
12
 The Japanese economy has a larger government and is also less open then Switzerland. The average share of 
total government expenditure in GDP over 1990-2003 was almost 50% in Japan versus 37% in Switzerland, 
while the average share of trade in GDP in these economies was 19.2 and 74.6%, respectively, over this time 
period.  
13
 The relative demand variable, described in the text, takes the value zero for 4.6% of the observations in the 
case of Japan and 22.8% of the observations in the case of Switzerland.  
14
 The number of firms (N) is excluded in the estimation for Switzerland as data on this variable is available only 
for 20% of the observations.  
15
 The simple average applied tariff (TAR) is effectively zero in the case of Switzerland, so this variable is 
excluded while estimating the foreign procurement of Swiss goods. In the case of Japan, this variable takes the 
value zero in 48.4% of the observations.     
16
 An increase in REER means currency appreciation and loss in competitiveness. 
17
 The URGPA dummy is only used in the goods estimation. Since the coverage of services in the GPA only 
began with the Uruguay Round, the URGPA dummy is rendered redundant in the services estimation.  
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where “k” denotes the industry/services sector (henceforth simply referred to as “sector”) and 
all economic data are expressed in real USD using the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator. 
 
In our empirical model, the value of the government‟s foreign procurement is the dependent 
variable, FPV. In the absence of data on the price of individual government contracts awarded 
to domestic and foreign firms, we use several supply-side sector-specific controls such as 
average productivity of labour (APL), number of firms (N), value of exports (X), number of 
export destinations (XD) and tariffs (TAR) as proxies for domestic firm competitiveness. 
Economy-wide income and prices effects are represented by macroeconomic variables such as 
annual rate of GDP growth (ROG), unemployment rate (UNEMP) and exchange rates 
(REER). In addition, we also control for political economy factors like election cycles 
(dummy variables for election years of the Japanese House of Representatives and the Swiss 
Parliament, and for the year preceding these election years; ELECt, ELECt-1) and for the role 
of the WTO‟s URGPA (URGPA dummy). Finally, to control for the magnitude of 
procurement demand in a particular sector, we construct a relative demand variable (RDN), 
which is the ratio of the number of contracts awarded in a particular sector to the total number 
of contracts awarded in a year. Our empirical model also tests whether any increase in public 
sector imports (FPV) is offset by a decline in private sector imports (M) for the "covered" 
goods and services, which essentially provides a ceteris paribus test of Baldwin‟s “neutrality 
proposition”.  
 
A priori, we expect the signs of β1, β9 and β12 to be positive and β2 through β6, β10 and β11 to be 
negative. A positive sign on the β7 coefficient would suggest that public and private sector 
imports were not substitutes and a positive sign on the β8 coefficient would suggest that 
governments purchased fewer contracts from foreign firms during periods of economic 
slowdown alluding to possible government efforts at aggregate demand management. It may 
be useful to point out that only domestic firm attributes such as an increase in the productivity 
of the domestic firms would be considered as non-discriminatory reasons for governments 
purchasing fewer goods and services from abroad. Most of the other factors for a decline in 
foreign procurement would, on the other hand, suggest the presence of a home-bias.      
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We also progressively control for unobserved time- and sector-specific heterogeneity in a 
fixed effects specification: 
FPVkt = αt + αk + β1'RDNkt + β2'APLkt + β3'Xkt + β4'XDkt + β5'Nkt + β6'TARkt + β7'Mkt + µ'kt 
 
and finally, allow the sector-specific fixed effects (SSFE) to vary according to a linear trend:  
FPVkt = α''t + αk.trend + β1''RDNkt + β2''APLkt + β3''Xkt + β4''XDkt + β5''Nkt + β6''TARkt + β7''Mkt 
+ µ''kt  
 
4.  Data availability, limitations and preliminary diagnosis  
 
Statistics submitted by the URGPA signatories to the WTO Secretariat are the primary source 
of data on government procurement. Article XIX: 5 of the URGPA requires that Contracting 
Parties submit procurement-related data to the Committee on Government Procurement. 
Unfortunately, only half of the 40 Contracting Parties (Canada, the EC, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Norway and the United States) have submitted these data regularly since the Uruguay Round, 
especially over 1997-2007
18
. Moreover, these submissions have been made electronically 
only since the Uruguay Round, which meant that the database for analysis in this paper before 
the year 1996 was assembled manually.  
 
Even amongst the countries that have submitted these data, there are significant differences, 
both in terms of what is included and how it is included
19
, and the need for consistency, has 
thus determined the choice of sample countries for the analysis in this paper. For both Japan 
and Switzerland, we consider all goods and services, including construction, included by them 
in Annexes 1, 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 of the URGPA; the list is provided in Annex Table A2 
of this paper.    
 
                                                 
18
 Switzerland has not provided data beyond 2003. A snapshot of country procurement submissions is available in 
Shingal (2011). 
19
 For instance, Norway and the US employ a different classification system compared to the EC, Japan and 
Switzerland which makes it impossible to analyze data at the level of the disaggregated good or service before the 
year 2008. Canada too uses a different classification system for services and provides no information on 
suppliers, so the amount of foreign procurement in services cannot be calculated. Hong Kong‟s submissions until 
the year 2008 have restricted access.  
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Sector-specific data on goods purchased by these two governments are taken from three 
different sources. Data on goods output, employment and number of firms in Japan are 
sourced from OECD STAN (various years) and Nicita & Olarreaga (2006) for the period 
1990-93 and from UNIDO (2010) 1994 onwards. Data on goods output in Switzerland are 
taken from Nicita & Olarreaga (2006) for the period 1991-96 and from UNIDO (2010) and 
OECD STAN (various years) for the period 1997-2003. Data on goods employment in 
Switzerland are taken from UNIDO (2010) and OECD STAN (various years) and that on the 
number of firms from UNIDO (2010). The last were available only for the period 1997-2003 
and that too were rather scant; the variable was therefore excluded from analysis.  
 
Sector-specific goods trade data on Japan are taken from OECD STAN (various years) and 
those on tariffs from Nicita & Olarreaga (2006). Swiss trade data are taken from OECD STAN 
(various years) and Nicita & Olarreaga (2006). Swiss tariffs on the goods included in our 
analysis are zero. Data on sector-specific services output and employment for the two 
countries are taken from OECD STAN (various years) and those on trade from OECD Trade 
in Services by Service Category (various years). Sector-specific data on the number of export 
destinations for both countries are compiled from UN Comtrade for goods trade and from 
IIDE (2009) for services trade.  
 
Data availability imposed significant constraints on our analysis, since we needed sector-
specific information on output, employment and trade for the two countries for the same 
sectors of goods and services over 1990-2003 and then needed to map this information with 
that on foreign procurement. To begin with, there were definitional issues for both goods and 
services, which assumed importance as we needed to achieve consistency across different 
classification systems used in the data sources
20
. Then in some cases, sector-specific output, 
employment and trade data were not available at the level of the individual goods sectors that 
these two governments purchased, which meant that data needed to be aggregated into broader 
sectors to enable meaningful analysis. This was especially true of sectors 11-13 and 22, 24 and 
25 for both countries. In some of these cases, however, more disaggregated data were 
available for exports but not for output or employment (and vice versa); thus, wherever 
                                                 
20
 The concordances used in this paper are taken from Shingal (2011). 
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possible, the aggregated data for output and employment were disaggregated using the export 
data (and vice versa).  
 
Despite all these efforts, a few goods sectors in both countries still had sector-specific output, 
employment, trade and tariff data missing. For instance, there were no data on output, 
employment, number of firms or trade for sectors 2 and 21 amongst the goods that the 
Japanese procured; tariff data were unavailable for sectors 2, 4, 14-15 and 21 over 1990-96 
and for sectors 2, 4, 14-15 and 21-22, 1997 onwards. In the case of Switzerland, goods-
specific data on output and employment were unavailable for sectors 2, 4, 10, 14-15 and 17-26 
over 1990-96; for sectors 2, 4, 10, and 18-21 for the year 1997; and for sectors 2-4, 9-10 and 
18-21 over 1998-2003. Trade data were missing for sectors 2 and 21 across this entire time 
period.   
 
As in the case of goods, sector-specific data on output, employment and trade were not 
available for all services sectors. In this case too, the individual services sectors were 
aggregated into broader sectors
 21
 to enable meaningful analysis. Even then, the absence of 
trade data for Swiss construction and computer-related services over the sample period meant 
that the effective sample size was further truncated in the case of Switzerland. This also led to 
relatively few services observations in the sample for both countries, due to which results from 
the empirical analysis that follows for services alone are more suggestive than conclusive.   
 
Annex Table A3 shows the mean value for the sample variables, along with their minimum, 
maximum and the standard deviation, for both Japan and Switzerland. Procurement data are 
reported in the country submissions in terms of Special Drawing Rights, the IMF‟s accounting 
unit. These values have thus first been converted to USD using exchange rates from the IMF‟s 
International Financial Statistics (various years). All economic data are reported in real terms 
using the US GDP implicit price deflator. As this table shows, there is lot of diversity in the 
availability of data on the variables used in the model, leading to several missing values, 
                                                 
21
 This yielded seven broad services sectors for Japan [construction (41), maintenance & repair (51-52), OBS (42, 
72-73, 75-77), transportation (53-57), communication (58, 61-65), computer-related (66-67, 71) and sewage & 
sanitation (78)] and six for Switzerland [construction, OBS (1, 8-18), financial (6), transportation (2-4), 
communication (5) and computer-related (7)]. 
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especially for sector-specific variables. We are thus left with unbalanced panels for both Japan 
and Switzerland. 
 
Comparing the evolution of these procurement metrics over 1990-2003 with that of the other 
sample variables in Table 1, we find that the decline in the share of FP in AT procurement of 
goods in both countries was accompanied by a considerable rise in the labour productivity of 
the domestic firms (from USD 126,000 to USD 328,000 in Japan and from USD 114,000 to 
USD 278,000 in Switzerland) and by a significant fall in the number of domestic firms (46.3% 
in Japan and 38.4% in Switzerland). At the same time, the annual rate of economic growth fell 
sharply in both countries, the unemployment rate went up considerably and the REER also 
appreciated by 6% over 1990-2003. This preliminary diagnosis goes partly with our model‟s 
predictions and suggests that these governments‟ sourcing decisions were driven as much by 
domestic firm attributes as by fluctuations in macroeconomic fundamentals. On the other 
hand, our model‟s predictions seem to hold less well for services, where a rise in domestic 
firm productivity is still accompanied by a rise in the share of foreign procurement. However, 
given that our data set is less complete for services, these results are also likely to be less 
conclusive. This said, for both goods and services, the import propensities move in an opposite 
direction to FP shares, which suggests that Baldwin‟s “neutrality proposition” may hold good 
in both countries, but the multivariate analysis that follows would provide a better test of that.        
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Finally, we exclude Swiss services procurement in 2003 from the empirical analysis that 
follows as that year was a statistical outlier in the Swiss procurement pattern (Shingal, 2011), 
characterized by an unusual purchase of high-value technical, scientific and consulting 
services from foreign firms. However, our empirical results remain qualitatively identical even 
without this adjustment to the sample data.  
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5.  Issues in estimation 
 
The choice of estimation technique was primarily governed by the characteristics of our 
sample data. Prima facie, our data was characterized by both over-dispersion and excess 
zeroes which rendered a log-linear OLS estimation biased
22
 and meant that we needed to 
consider non-linear techniques such as those suitable for count data estimation.         
 
Over-dispersion in the raw data is the result of unobserved heterogeneity (Greene, 1994) and 
the description is used for data where the conditional variance is in excess of the conditional 
mean. Untreated over- or under-dispersion results in consistent, yet inefficient, estimates 
characterized by spuriously large z-values and spuriously small p-values due to downward 
biased standard errors (Gourieroux et al., 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). We found our 
data on foreign procurement value to be strongly skewed to the right for both Japan and 
Switzerland (Figure 1). The variance-to-mean ratio was found to be 139 in the case of 
Japanese FPV and 43.4 in the case of Swiss FPV. 
 
Data is said to suffer from “excess zeroes” when the number of zeroes in the raw data is 
greater than what the Poisson or NB distributions can predict and is the result of an 
overabundance of zeroes, suggesting that some of the zeroes in the data may be generated by a 
different process. Our dependent variable was found to be zero for 29.4% of the observations 
in the case of Japan and 49.4% of the observations in the case of Switzerland. 
 
Treatment of count data with over-dispersion and excess zeroes offers three estimation 
possibilities - the Negative Binomial (NB), the Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) and the Zero-
Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB). The NB allows for between-subject heterogeneity, but the 
ZIP does not. However, as opposed to the NB, the zero-inflated models allow for different 
                                                 
22
 Using a log-linear model would effectively truncate the size of the sample
 
(because the log of zero is not 
defined) and hence, yields biased estimates. One way to solve this problem would be by adding a small positive 
constant to all zero values of the dependent variable (normally this is done by adding 1 to all zeroes because 
log(1)=0), but this would not only amount to data manipulation but would also bias the estimates if the incidence 
of zeroes was correlated with other observed or unobserved factors i.e. if there was some economic rationale for 
the incidence of zeroes (for e.g. in the context of gravity model estimations, Baldwin and Harigan (2008) have 
shown the export zeroes to be strongly correlated with distance and size of the importing country). 
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data-generating processes for zero and non-zero count data and in that, may be theoretically 
more appropriate for our analysis as they allow for the possibility of foreign procurement 
being zero in a good/service sector because there were no foreign suppliers and/or there were 
differences in preferences and/or quality as opposed to foreign procurement being zero 
because the foreign suppliers were less-competitive.  
 
However, when we compared the three available choices using the Countfit function in Stata 
(Long & Freese, 2005), the test and fit statistics reported in Annex Table A1
23
 suggested that 
the NB was the best estimator for both our primary and secondary (see Section 6.1 below) 
estimations in the baseline specifications.
24
 Moreover, when we estimated our primary and 
secondary equations using either the ZIP or the ZINB, the standard errors on the coefficients 
in the inflation equations (those predicting certain zero FP) were found to be very large, 
suggesting a definite lack of fit of either model to our data for both countries
25
. This further 
corroborated our choice of the NB as the preferred estimator for our baseline specifications 
and suggested that our raw data were possibly only characterized by over-dispersion
26
 and not 
by excess zeroes.                 
 
The related issue in our fixed effects specification was the choice between the 
conditional/panel and the unconditional fixed effects negative binomial (FENB). Literature 
suggests that the conditional/panel FENB is not a "true FE" model (Allison & Waterman, 
2002) as it requires a specific functional relationship between the individual FEs and the 
                                                 
23
 This table only reports results from the primary goods estimation in both countries as goods both dominate and 
have the more complete data in our sample. As it turned out, services observations were not sufficient to 
successfully implement the Countfit function in Stata, especially in the secondary estimation.    
24
 The plot of residuals (Figure 2 shows this only for the primary goods estimation) suggested that the ZINB and 
NB were preferable to the ZIP (with the latter considerably under-estimating the probability of zero counts). 
Further, in all cases, the residual plots for the NB and ZINB were found to be identical especially for counts 
exceeding one, with the NB providing a better fit at count zero. Moreover, while the Vuong statistic (Vuong, 
1989) suggested a statistically significant preference for ZINB over NB, the Bayesian Information Criterion 
suggested a strong preference for the NB over ZINB. Finally, while the plot of residuals suggested the ZIP to be 
the preferred estimator in the primary estimation for Japan, the following footnote and the associated text 
explains why we still chose the NB.       
25
 The large negative coefficients at the lower bound of the confidence intervals of the inflation equation meant 
that the xb vector would take on large negative values when evaluated at this lower bound so that the value of its 
cumulative distribution function would essentially be zero. At zero value, the zero-inflated models fail to model 
over-dispersion in the raw data, so the ZINB reduces to NB and the ZIP to Poisson (Long, 1997). 
26
 In fact, the generally statistically significant non-zero values of the over-dispersion parameter (alpha) in the 
empirical results that follow confirm this finding, especially for non-services. 
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individual over-dispersion parameter to cancel out the FEs and there is no a priori reason to 
assume that this would be the case (Guimarães, 2008). Hence, introducing FEs via sector-
specific dummies in the NB model is superior to the conditional/panel FENB and does not 
even suffer from any "incidental parameter" bias (Allison & Waterman, 2002). We thus 
estimated our FEs specifications using the unconditional FENB. 
 
6.  Results from empirical analysis 
 
The results from the primary estimation carried on Japanese data are reported in Table 2 and 
those on Swiss data in Table 3. In each of these tables, columns I-IV report results for goods 
and services together, columns V-VIII report results for only goods and columns IX-XII for 
only services. In each case, we begin by estimating the baseline specification, then 
progressively control for year fixed effects, time-invariant year and sector-specific fixed 
effects and finally allow the SSFE to vary according to a linear trend. All tables report robust 
estimates to account for the heteroskedasticity in the raw data for both countries. Finally, the 
NB is a log-linear model that, like the logit, has an odds-ratio interpretation for the estimated 
coefficients.      
 
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 here> 
 
Across most specifications, our results suggest the overwhelming importance of the magnitude 
of procurement demand in explaining foreign public procurement of goods and services. For 
instance, a 1% unit increase in our relative demand variable raises the value of foreign 
procurement of Japanese goods and services in the baseline specification 11 times
27
, ceteris 
paribus and on average. The estimated coefficients reduce considerably in magnitude when 
the estimating equations include time-invariant SSFE, thereby suggesting that not controlling 
for unobserved sector-specific heterogeneity biases these results upwards. Thus, 
unobservables such as the price, quality or even the nature of the good/service being procured 
seems to explain some of the variation in foreign procurement value that was earlier explained 
                                                 
27
 This is calculated as [exp(7.0)-1]. In general, for explanatory variable Xk, the percentage change in Y for a δ 
unit change in Xk is given by [exp(βk*δ)-1]*100. 
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by the relative demand variable, which is also what anecdotal evidence (Shingal, 2009) 
suggests.  
 
Japanese foreign procurement of goods and services separately varies inversely with domestic 
supply-side controls
28
 of labour productivity, export value and tariffs in the absence of SSFE. 
However, once these effects are included in estimation, foreign procurement value moves in 
the same direction as these controls, a result that goes against our model's predictions
29
. This 
seems to suggest that the quality or nature of the good/service to be procured swamped 
domestic firm competitiveness in determining the Japanese government‟s propensity to source 
from abroad. In the case of Switzerland, foreign procurement value generally varies directly 
with supply-side controls of exports and the number of export destinations and foreign 
procurement of non-services varies directly with labour productivity. These are all counter-
intuitive outcomes that seem to suggest that efficiency attributes may not have had a bearing 
on Swiss governments‟ purchase decisions during this period. However, the results for labour 
productivity are reversed with time-invariant SSFE. This seems to suggest that rising domestic 
firm competitiveness translated into lower Swiss foreign procurement of goods of a specific 
nature or quality.    
 
Public and private sector imports are not found to offset each other in the case of Japanese 
goods. However, the increase in foreign procurement in the SSFE specification for Swiss 
goods seems to be at the expense of private sector imports. Specifically, a one unit increase in 
private sector imports lowers the value of foreign procurement of Swiss goods by 0.05%, 
ceteris paribus and on average (Column VII, Table 3). This is the only evidence of our sample 
data meeting Baldwin‟s "neutrality proposition" in our primary estimation.  
 
On the whole, our results do not provide much support for the role of economic growth rates, 
exchange rates, electoral cycles & the URGPA in determining Japanese foreign procurement 
value. In the case of Switzerland on the other hand, foreign procurement, at least of services, is 
                                                 
28
 The result with respect to the number of firms is as expected but lacks statistical significance; in the case of the 
number of export destinations, however, the result is counter-intuitive and statistically significant for goods with 
SSFE. 
29
 With trend-varying SSFE, we again get the expected results. 
19 
 
found to be negatively correlated with economic growth; exchange rate appreciation seems to 
have a negative effect on foreign procurement in general; and foreign procurement of services 
seems to go up in the year preceding the election year. The last two results go against our 
model‟s predictions and may suggest greater discrimination in the award of public contracts 
by Swiss governments.        
 
The coefficient on the URGPA dummy is positive and statistically significant for Swiss goods 
procurement, which suggests that the disciplining mechanisms of the URGPA may have led to 
greater foreign access to that government‟s goods procurement market. Specifically, the post-
URGPA years saw a 103.4% greater value of foreign goods procurement relative to the pre-
URGPA years, ceteris paribus and on average. However, we do not find a similar positive 
statistically significant effect for Japan. 
6.1. Robustness check - Secondary estimation of “pseudo” import demand for 
contracts 
As a robustness check, we also estimate a separate pseudo-import demand function of 
procurement contracts in a secondary estimation. The dependent variable in this secondary 
estimation is the number of contracts purchased from foreign suppliers (MDD). In addition to 
the control variables used in the primary estimation, we include the average value
30
 of a 
contract procured domestically (PD) and internationally (PF) in the secondary estimation in 
both the baseline and fixed effects specifications. PD and PF are expected to impact, 
negatively and positively, respectively, on the pseudo-import demand for contracts given that 
a larger value contract is expected to be more attractive to a bidding firm. The baseline 
specification for the secondary estimation is as follows:          
 
MDDkt = α‟ + γ1RDV
31
kt + γ2PDkt + γ3PFkt + γ4APLkt + γ5Xkt + γ6XDkt + γ7Nkt + γ8TARkt + 
γ9Mkt + γ10ROGt + γ11REERt + γ12ELECt + γ13ELECt-1 + γ14URGPAt + δkt 
 
                                                 
30
 Given that data are also available on the number of contracts purchased from domestic and foreign suppliers, 
we calculate the average value of a contract procured domestically and internationally by dividing the total 
contract value purchased from domestic and foreign suppliers by the respective number of procurement contracts. 
31
 The relative demand variable in the secondary estimation is constructed with respect to contract value as the 
ratio of the value of contracts awarded in a particular sector to the total value of contracts awarded in a year.  
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Table 4 reports the results of the secondary estimation for Japan and Table 5 for Switzerland. 
The results from this estimation confirm the findings from the primary estimation with respect 
to the importance of the magnitude of procurement demand and unobserved sector-specific 
heterogeneity, the mixed relationship with domestic supply-side controls, the non-
substitutability of public and private sector goods imports in the case of Japan, and the general 
lack of response of Japanese public purchases to macroeconomic factors and political budget 
cycles.  
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 here> 
 
The biggest turnaround in these results, however, emerges in the coefficients on the URGPA 
dummy. Unlike in the primary estimation, the URGPA seems to have fostered import demand 
for Japanese goods contracts and made it more robust for Swiss goods
32
. This result, coupled 
with the opposite finding from the primary estimation of foreign procurement value at least in 
the case of Japan, suggests that the disciplining mechanisms of the URGPA may have been 
more successful in increasing import demand for those goods contracts where the average 
contract value was not large.  
 
Finally, looking at the impact of average contract value on the import demand for contracts, 
we find that the impact of the average value of a contract awarded to a domestic firm is 
statistically insignificant for goods procurement in both countries. The average value of a 
contract awarded to a foreign firm has a negative impact on the import demand for Japanese 
and Swiss goods, but a generally positive effect on their import demand for services. This last 
result for goods is counter-intuitive and seems to suggest that foreign firms may be in these 
goods procurement markets irrespective of average contract value. 
 
 
                                                 
32
 The post-URGPA years saw an 82.2% and 249% larger import demand for goods contracts relative to the pre-
URGPA years in the case of Japan and Switzerland, respectively, ceteris paribus and on average.  
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7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze procurement data submitted by Japan and Switzerland to the WTO 
over the period 1990-2003 for the effect of macroeconomic, political economy, procurement-
specific and domestic policy factors that may have influenced these governments‟ sourcing 
decisions from abroad. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first empirical test of the 
effectiveness of the URGPA in increasing market access for foreign suppliers and of the 
ceteris paribus substitutability of public and private sector imports.   
 
Our first major conclusion is that the most important factors that have a bearing on 
governments‟ sourcing decisions are those related to domestic firm attributes and the 
magnitude of procurement demand. The expected role of macroeconomic factors and political 
budget cycles does not come through in our empirical analysis. The non-substitutability 
between Japanese public and private sector imports seems to suggest that this government‟s 
demand exceeded the undistorted free trade level of domestic supply during this period 
(Evenett & Hoekman, 2005). The opposite finding for Switzerland, on the other hand, points 
to a home-bias in that government‟s purchase patterns. 
 
Our model‟s predictions on the impact of domestic firm attributes seem to be met more by 
Japanese data than the Swiss; our findings on the impact of exchange rates and electoral cycles 
too suggest that Swiss public purchase patterns may have been more discriminatory towards 
foreign suppliers during these years than those of the Japanese.  
 
Finally, though the URGPA requires that contracts above a certain minimum threshold value 
be subject to internationally competitive bidding, this does not always ensure that high value 
contracts are awarded to foreign suppliers, even if the latter were more efficient, which 
underlines the scope for plugging this loophole in possible reform of this agreement. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of foreign procurement value (real USD mn) 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of residual plots in estimating foreign 
procurement of goods 
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  Note: (1) “NBRM” stands for the Negative Binomial Regression Model; “ZIP” stands for the Zero-inflated Poisson; 
“ZINB” stands for the Zero-inflated Negative Binomial 
 
28 
 
Table 1: Evolution of sample variables over time 
Year TPV ATV FPV(%) ATN FPN(%) Y M_Prop (%) X_Prop (%) N L APL TAR ROG UNEMP REER
1990 7194 2953.0 13.8 7081 27.8 1575292.7 6.8 13.7 371556 12455507 0.126 2.41 5.2 2.1 75.0
1991 8095 3598.7 14.8 8072 24.7 1849721.4 6.4 13.4 388619 12685728 0.146 2.29 3.4 2 80.8
1992 8143 3713.1 14.9 7424 27.4 2005705.4 5.9 14.0 374488 12709965 0.158 2.24 1 2.2 83.4
1993 8941 4488.7 20.8 9060 28.9 2168615.0 6.3 14.2 372382 12135989 0.179 2.24 0.2 2.5 98.4
1997 45485 6045.6 14.9 9206 28.0 1952595.8 10.6 18.3 247372 7548248 0.259 1.74 1.6 3.4 83.6
1998 88360 12698.9 14.0 10062 25.3 1726083.8 12.5 23.2 256891 7421873 0.233 1.53 -2 4.1 82.2
1999 49745 6257.0 12.7 8396 22.3 1917741.1 12.6 22.5 237509 7098685 0.270 1.47 -0.1 4.7 93.0
2000 44137 5438.6 16.5 8242 23.7 2134796.7 11.6 20.2 233480 6951040 0.307 1.37 2.9 4.8 100.0
2001 41291 5268.6 12.1 7629 22.6 1885233.7 12.1 19.0 216167 6461663 0.292 1.47 0.2 5 89.5
2002 47749 4980.9 15.5 8127 23.8 1738423.3 14.6 24.4 199669 6101126 0.285 1.47 0.3 5.4 82.9
2003 54991.1 5913.8 11.4 7129 22.4 1959497.4 15.3 25.9 na 5973331 0.328 2.42 1.4 5.2 81.4
Year TPV ATV FPV(%) ATN FPN(%) Y M_Prop (%) X_Prop (%) N L APL TAR ROG UNEMP REER
1997 45485 26521.7 0.6 36147 0.2 2022220.2 3.4 2.6 na 17906478 0.113 1.6 3.4 83.6
1998 88360 26657.9 1.2 10365 0.7 2252842.9 2.8 2.1 na 17618138 0.128 -2 4.1 82.2
1999 49745 15997.2 0.7 17639 0.4 2574553.7 2.4 1.8 na 17407620 0.148 -0.1 4.7 93.0
2000 44137 13907.2 0.8 14645 0.5 2415380.4 2.7 2.1 na 17559240 0.138 2.9 4.8 100.0
2001 41291 16049.0 0.8 17801 0.5 2122614.8 3.0 2.3 na 17528041 0.121 0.2 5 89.5
2002 47749 19286.7 0.7 21571 0.5 2323294.6 2.7 2.1 na 17331294 0.134 0.3 5.4 82.9
2003 54991.1 11202.9 1.0 2618 3.3 2639735.7 2.5 2.0 na 17373377 0.152 1.4 5.2 81.4
Year TPV ATV FPV(%) ATN FPN(%) Y M_Prop (%) X_Prop (%) N L APL TAR ROG UNEMP REER
1990 642.5 274.5 76.0 368 69.6 130443.9 40.1 39.0 na 1147900 0.114 0.0 3.8 0.5 100.2
1991 720.6 293.5 66.0 428 61.2 131137.5 38.7 38.4 na 716602 0.183 0.0 -0.9 1.7 102.2
1993 652.5 231.7 70.0 486 74.9 130167.8 37.1 41.2 na 645064 0.202 0.0 -0.2 3.7 102.7
1994 690.3 278.6 69.0 368 65.8 147454.7 37.1 40.8 na 636931 0.232 0.0 1.2 3.8 107.4
1995 676.3 222.0 59.3 292 63.0 177647.2 37.3 40.2 na 640642 0.277 0.0 0.4 3.3 114.4
1996 1404.5 184.0 56.0 287 61.7 170542.7 34.8 37.7 na 621350 0.274 0.0 0.6 3.7 111.3
1997 1856.3 283.3 25.5 424 53.3 148625.3 42.6 46.0 17905 439963 0.338 0.0 2.1 4.1 102.9
1998 1551.5 228.8 56.1 327 54.1 97334.7 73.8 76.9 17440 367999 0.264 0.0 2.6 3.6 104.2
1999 1517.7 322.3 44.3 323 48.3 83580.5 78.9 83.5 16975 433966 0.193 0.0 1.3 3.1 102.3
2000 1744.5 272.7 36.1 461 30.8 84574.2 88.2 91.4 17366 445409 0.190 0.0 3.6 2.6 100
2001 1898.2 299.3 42.9 417 35.3 85198.6 89.0 92.8 16168 448889 0.190 0.0 1.2 2.5 103.1
2002 1815.1 168.3 53.6 845 69.7 101399.2 82.9 93.1 11036 435998 0.233 0.0 0.4 2.9 106.8
2003 2200.7 256.3 51.5 1026 67.0 114269.8 83.7 94.0 na 411384 0.278 0.0 -0.2 4.1 106.4
Year TPV ATV FPV(%) ATN FPN(%) Y M_Prop (%) X_Prop (%) N L APL TAR ROG UNEMP REER
1996 1404.5 211.4 9.4 194 8.8 na na na na 1084114 na 0.6 3.7 111.3
1997 1856.3 255.4 4.2 320 5.9 160497.8 2.4 9.3 na 1082364 0.148 2.1 4.1 102.9
1998 1551.5 488.5 8.2 455 4.8 179963.6 2.7 9.3 na 1092921 0.165 2.6 3.6 104.2
1999 1517.7 305.8 4.3 284 8.5 160936.4 3.1 11.6 na 1113723 0.145 1.3 3.1 102.3
2000 1744.5 318.7 3.1 302 6.0 169765.2 3.2 11.8 na 1146172 0.148 3.6 2.6 100
2001 1898.2 478.0 4.8 327 6.1 170603.2 3.0 10.8 na 1200572 0.142 1.2 2.5 103.1
2002 1815.1 347.6 2.6 379 3.2 218742.2 2.0 8.7 na 1221333 0.179 0.4 2.9 106.8
2003 2200.7 517.6 25.4 447 23.9 250445.9 1.9 9.1 na 1215538 0.206 -0.2 4.1 106.4
JAPANESE PROCUREMENT OF GOODS
SWISS PROCUREMENT OF SERVICES
SWISS PROCUREMENT OF GOODS
JAPANESE PROCUREMENT OF SERVICES
 
 
Source: WTO (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators (various years); Nicita & Olarreaga 
(2006); OECD STAN (various years); OECD Trade in Services (various years); UNIDO (2010); own 
calculations 
Note: (1) “TPV” stands for total procurement value; “ATV” stands for above-threshold procurement by value of 
contracts; “FPV” stands for share of foreign procurement in AT procurement by value of contracts; “ATN” 
stands for above-threshold procurement by number of contracts; “FPN” stands for share of foreign procurement 
in AT procurement by number of contracts; “M_Prop” denotes the share of private sector imports in output; 
“X_Prop” denotes the share of private sector exports in output; rest of the variables are as defined in Table 1  (2) 
TPV, ATV, Y and APL are reported in USD mn  (3) There are no data on services procurement before 1996 as 
the coverage of services in the GPA only began with the Uruguay Round.  
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Table 2: Estimating Japanese foreign procurement value 
 
Explanatory variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Relative demand 7.0** 7.1** 0.98 5.6** 17.6 19.1 8.2** 11.2*** 5.3*** 6.6*** 3.6*** 7.8***
Productivity 2.9*** 3.3*** 1.7 9.03*** -5.9*** -5.5*** 2.1 -2.4 -29.3*** -28.2*** 45.7*** -36.9***
Exports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -.00002*** -.000023*** 0.00 -.00003*** -.0005*** -.00024** .00025** -.00025**
# Export destinations -.007*** -.007*** .018** 0.00 0.00 0.00 .047*** .0078*** -0.03 -1.29*** -0.12 -0.01
Number of firms -.000022* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tariffs -.51*** -.51*** -0.29 -.59***
Imports 0.00 0.00 .0001*** 0.00 .00016*** .00015*** .00017*** .0002*** .00017* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rate of growth -.15* -0.04 -0.15
Exchange rate 0.01 0.02 -0.02
Election year -0.13 -0.14 1.4*
Election year (-1) -0.23 -0.26 0.73
URGPA 0.12 0.04
Constant 3.23** 3.01*** -8.62*** -1.50 1.41 2.4*** -12.62** -0.04 11.25*** 69.0*** 2.12 -23.06
# observations 281 281 281 281 180 180 180 180 35 35 35 35
df_m 10 15 43 26 12 16 35 26 9 11 15 18
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant SSFE No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No
Trend-varying SSFE No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Over-dispersion parameter (alpha) 3.67*** 3.67*** 0.51*** 3.1*** 2.6*** 2.56*** 0.59*** 1.93*** 1.12 0.76 0.00 0.00***  
 
Note: (1) Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (2) Table reports robust estimates   
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Estimating Swiss foreign procurement value
 
Explanatory variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
Relative demand 20.0*** 20.2*** 7.3*** 21.86*** 30.58*** 29.95*** 10.14*** 29.6*** 18.16*** 19.8*** -19.9**
Productivity 5.4*** 6.5*** -3.3** 4.4*** 2.46 3.26* -5.4** 1.33 -16.7** -33.47 -163.9**
Exports .00006** .00006** 0.00 .00009*** .00008*** .00008*** 0.00 .0001*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
# Export destinations .004*** .004*** .02** 0.00 .003** .003** .02** 0.00 -.05** .4*** 0.66
Imports .0002*** .0002** -.0004** .0001* 0.00 0.00 -.0005** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rate of growth -0.08 -0.10 -.74**
Exchange rate -.13*** -.083** -.59***
Election year 0.45 0.30 -0.53
Election year (-1) .50** 0.42 3.36***
URGPA 0.36 .71**
Constant 9.9** -2.02*** -2.22 -1.12 6.69 -1.04 -1.41 -0.04 62.2*** -7.14*** 13.90
# observations 156 156 156 156 130 130 130 130 26 26 26
df_m 10 17 33 30 10 17 29 30 9 10 13
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time-invariant SSFE No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Trend-varying SSFE No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No
Over-dispersion parameter (alpha) 1.34* 1.23 0.32** 1.07 1.19 1.04 0.34*** 0.75 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***  
 
Note: (1) Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (2) Table reports robust estimates  
(3) Convergence was not attained in the services estimation with trend-varying SSFE, hence column XII is 
absent in the table 
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Table 4: Estimating Japanese import demand for contracts
 
Explanatory variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Relative demand 12.8*** 12.7*** 2.65*** 11.6** 28.8*** 29.5*** 7.47*** 24.6*** -4.1881965* -4.1 1.8 6.4***
Average contract size (domestic) -0.2 -0.2 .05* -0.2 0.1 .23* 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 .065** .2**
Average contract size (foreign) -.25** -.28*** 0.0 -.24** -.14** -.14** 0.0 0.0 .22*** .20** 0.0 -.21*
Productivity 2.9*** 2.96*** -0.7 9.2*** -5.7*** -6.1*** -3.6** -1.3 -23.0*** -23.9*** 14.9*** -13.0***
Exports 0.0 0.0 0.0 -.00002** 0.0 0.0 0.0 -.000016*** -.0007*** -.0007*** 0.0 -.00066***
# Export destinations 0.0 0.0 .016*** 0.0 0.0 0.0 .019*** .007*** 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Number of firms -.00003*** -.00003*** .000025*** -.000013**
Tariffs -.24*** -.25*** .30* -.35***
Imports -.00007** -.00007** .00007*** 0.0 .00009** .0001** .00006** .00018*** .0004** .0004** 0.0 .00045***
Rate of growth -0.06 -0.03 -0.04
Exchange rate 0.00 0.02 -0.02
Election year -0.18 -0.17 1.33
Election year (-1) -0.32 -0.26 0.83
URGPA .81** .60**
Constant 3.4** 3.4*** -4.6*** 0.9 1.2 2.1*** -9.8*** -0.4 7.4*** 13.6 -0.1 -12.5
# observations 214 214 214 214 127 127 127 127 29 29 29 29
df_m 12 17 45 28 14 18 37 28 11 13 17 20
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant SSFE No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No
Trend-varying SSFE No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Over-dispersion parameter (alpha) 2.1*** 2.1*** 0.07*** 1.9*** 0.9 0.8 0.0*** 0.4*** 0.1 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***   
 
Note: (1) Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  (2) Table reports robust estimates 
 
 
 
Table 5: Estimating Swiss import demand for contracts 
  
Explanatory variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII X XI XII
Relative demand 8.4*** 8.7*** 3.6** 8.0*** 18.1*** 17.5*** 4.7*** 17.2*** -5.3*** -9.4*** -5.3***
Average contract size (domestic) -0.12 -0.20 -0.07 -0.25 -0.21 -0.24 -0.07 -0.62 -.94*** -.41*** -.94***
Average contract size (foreign) -.51*** -.51*** -.29*** -.62*** -.80*** -.82*** -0.21 -.72*** 1.4*** -.12*** 1.4***
Productivity 6.3*** 6.6*** -3.1** 7.5*** 3.0*** 3.4*** -7.4** 3.6*** -411.2*** -2.1*** -411.2***
Exports 0.00 0.00 .0001** 0.00 0.00 0.00 .0002*** 0.00 .009*** -.003*** .009***
# Export destinations .0024** .0027** .018*** 0.00 .0023** .002* .024* .002* .95*** .18*** .95***
Imports .0002*** .0002*** -.0005*** .00024*** 0.00 0.00 -.0006*** 0.00 -.01*** -.004*** -.01***
Rate of growth -0.02 -0.07
Exchange rate -.12*** -.08***
Election year 0.17 0.06
Election year (-1) 0.28 0.16
URGPA .86*** 1.25***
Constant 10.7*** -0.57 -0.04 -1.80 8.2*** 0.01 -1.09 -0.41 30.5*** 25.8*** 30.5***
# observations 97 97 97 97 84 84 84 84 13 13 13
df_m 12 19 32 32 12 19 29 32 11 7 2
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-invariant SSFE No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes No
Trend-varying SSFE No No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes
Over-dispersion parameter (alpha) 1.55*** 0.60*** 0.06*** 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.46*** 0.02 0.37*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0***  
 
Note: (1) Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  (2) Table reports robust estimates  
(3) Convergence was not attained in the services estimation in the baseline specification, hence column IX is 
absent in the table 
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Table A1: Tests & fit statistics from Countfit 
 
NBRM BIC = 149.987 AIC =  5.778 Prefer Over Evidence NBRM BIC = 39.664 AIC = 4.908 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZIP BIC = 2121.316 dif = -1971.330 NBRM ZIP Very strong vs ZIP BIC = 454.912 dif = -415.248 NBRM ZIP Very strong
AIC = 16.712 dif = -10.934 NBRM ZIP AIC = 8.08 dif = -3.172 NBRM ZIP
vs ZINB BIC = 159.800 dif = -9.814 NBRM ZINB Strong vs ZINB BIC = 49.399 dif = -9.735 NBRM ZINB Strong
AIC =  5.797 dif = -0.019 NBRM ZINB AIC = 4.939 dif = -0.031 NBRM ZINB
Vuong = 1.856 prob =  0.032 ZINB NBRM p = 0.032    Vuong = -6.842 prob = 0 NBRM ZINB p = 0.000    
ZIP BIC = 2121.316 AIC=    16.712 Prefer Over Evidence ZIP BIC = 454.912 AIC= 8.08 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB BIC = 159.800 dif = 1961.516 ZINB ZIP Very strong vs ZINB BIC= 49.399 dif = 405.513 ZINB ZIP Very strong
AIC = 5.797 dif = 10.915 ZINB ZIP AIC = 4.939 dif = 3.141 ZINB ZIP
LRX2 = 1966.709 prob = 0.000 ZINB ZIP p = 0.000    LRX2= 410.381 prob = 0 ZINB ZIP p = 0.000    
Primary estimation for goods (Japan) Primary estimation for goods (Switzerland)
 
Note: (1) “NBRM” stands for the Negative Binomial Regression Model; “ZIP” stands for the Zero-inflated 
Poisson; “ZINB” stands for the Zero-inflated Negative Binomial (2) “AIC” stands for the Akaike Information 
Criterion; “BIC” stands for the Bayesian Information Criterion; “Vuong” stands for the Vuong test statistic 
(Vuong, 1989) that tests for “excess zeroes” in the raw data; “LRX2” stands for the Likelihood Ratio Test. 
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Table A2: Goods and services procured by the Japanese and Swiss 
governments
Goods (Japan & Switzerland): (1) Products from agriculture, and from agricultural and food processing 
industries (2) Mineral products (3) Products of the chemical and allied industries (4) Medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products (5) Artificial resins and plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers, and articles 
thereof:  rubber, synthetic rubber, factice, and articles thereof; raw hides and skins, leather, fur skins and articles 
thereof, other than articles of apparel and clothing accessories of leather, saddlery and harness, articles of animal 
gut (6) Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal, cork and articles of cork;  paper making material;  paper and 
paperboard and articles thereof:  manufactures of straw of esparto and of other planting materials, basketwork 
and wickerwork (7) Textiles and textile articles, footwear, headgear umbrellas; sunshades;  walking sticks, 
whips, riding crops and parts thereof:  travel goods;  hand-bags and similar containers;  articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories, of leather or composition leather (8) Articles of stone, plaster, asbestos, mica and similar 
materials; ceramic products, other than sanitary fixtures; glass and glassware, other than illuminating and 
signalling glassware and optical elements of glass, not optically worked nor of optical glass (9) Iron and steel 
and articles thereof, other than boilers and radiators for central heating, air heaters and hot air distributors not 
electrically heated (10) Non-ferrous metals and articles, other than lamp and lighting fittings (11) Power 
generating machinery and equipment (12) Machinery specialized for particular industries (13) General industrial 
machinery and equipment, and machine parts (14) Office machines and automatic data processing equipment 
(15) Telecommunications and sound recording and reproducing apparatus and equipment (16) Electrical 
machinery, apparatus and appliances, and electrical parts thereof (17) Road vehicles (18) Railway vehicles and 
associated equipment (19) Aircraft and associated equipment (20) Ships boats and floating structures (21) 
Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting equipment (22) Medical, dental, surgical and veterinary equipment (23) 
Furniture and parts thereof (24) Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus (25) 
Photographic apparatus, equipment and optical goods;  watches and clocks (26) Miscellaneous articles 
Services (Japan): (41) Construction work (42) Architectural, engineering and other technical (51) 
Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles (52) Maintenance and repair of motorcycles and snowmobiles (53) 
Other land transport (54) Rental of sea-going vessels with operator (55) Rental of non-sea-going vessels with 
operator (56) Air transport (57) Freight transport agency (58) Courier (61) Electronic mail (62) Voice mail (63) 
On-line information and database retrieval (64) Electronic data interchange (65) Enhanced facsimile (66) Code 
and protocol conversion (67) On-line information and/or data processing (71) Computer and related (72) Market 
research and public opinion polling (73) Advertising (74) Armoured car (75) Building-cleaning (76) Publishing 
and printing (77) Repair incidental to metal products, machinery and equipment (78) Sewage and refuse 
disposal, sanitation and other environmental protection services 
Services (Switzerland): (1) Discussion to the wide direction (discussion, inspection, repairs) (2) Land 
transportation, including transportation of money and mail, except postal traffic and rail transportation (3) Air 
transportation, transportation of travellers and of merchandise, except transportation of courier (4) 
Transportation of mail by land or by airplane (except rail transportation) (5) Telecommunications (except vocal 
telephony, telex, radio telephony, radio-messaging and telecommunications by satellite) (6) Assurance and 
bank, except financial services relating to the transmission, sale, purchase or transfer of titles or of other 
financial instruments, as well as services furnished by central banks (7) Computer and related (8) Accounting, 
auditing and book-keeping (9) Market and public-opinion polling (10) Management consulting and related (11) 
Architecture, urban installation and environmental architecture (12) Consulting and technical, technical 
integrated, relevant scientific and technical consulting, technical essays and analyses of construction projects 
(13) Works of study (auction of identical markets to several contractors to obtain different suggestions of 
solutions) (14) Consulting and technical, technical integrated, relevant scientific and technical consulting, 
technical essays and analyses not concerning construction projects (15) Advertising, information and public 
relations (16) Cleanings of buildings and property management (17) Edition and impression (18) Sewage and 
refuse disposal, sanitation and analogous services 
Construction services (Switzerland): (1) Preparation of the sites and work-sites of construction (2) 
Construction of buildings (3) Construction of civil works (4) Assembly and construction of prefabricated works 
(5) Works of specialized businesses of construction (6) Putting installations (7) Secondary work and building 
finishing (8) Housing and credit lease concerning equipments of construction or of demolition, personnel works 
 
Source: WTO (various years) 
Note: (1) The numbers in parentheses refer to goods and services sectors referred to in the paper (2) The list of 
Swiss services and construction services has been translated into English from French 
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Table A3: Data description for the empirical model 
Country
Variable description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Procurement-specific variables
Total procurement (real USD mn) 326 40957.0 23755.9 7194 88360 334 1395.5 541.3 642.5 2200.7
AT procurement (real USD mn) 326 585.8 1913.9 0 16141.9 334 18.7 45.8 0.0 381.2
Foreign procurement (real USD mn) 326 30.5 65.2 0 545.5 334 6.1 16.3 0.0 130.4
FP share in AT procurement 312 0.14 0.20 0 1 258 0.32 0.35 0.0 1.0
Relative demand (value) 326 0.03 0.08 0 0.51 334 0.04 0.1 0.0 0.5
Relative demand (number) 326 0.03 0.09 0 0.76 334 0.04 0.1 0.0 0.5
Number of contracts (total) 326 647.9 2670.4 0 34692 334 26.2 60.0 0.0 612.0
Number of contracts (domestic) 308 609.8 2728.5 1 34688 239 20.6 38.6 1.0 230.0
Number of contracts (foreign) 326 71.8 171.8 0 1202 334 11.5 43.9 0.0 537.0
Average contract size domestic (real USD mn) 308 1.3 2.7 0.032 27.9 239 0.8 0.89 0.02 7.0
Average contract size foreign (real USD mn) 229 1.2 2.1 0.01 16.9 169 1.0 3.6 0.0 46.9
Sector-specific variables
Gross output (real USD mn) 297 125469.2 176321.1 2476.1 1100000 192 15173.6 16234.8 0.0 82000.9
Imports (real USD mn) 281 9354.3 9311.2 135.7 37792.9 292 3084.4 2333.0 32.2 12015.8
Exports (real USD mn) 281 15350.0 19552.4 274 121150 292 3655.5 4454.1 7.1 22003.1
Import propensity 281 0.15 0.16 0.004 0.95 175 1 1.7 0.0007 7.6
Export propensity 281 0.25 0.32 0.004 2.6 175 0.45 0.38 0.035 1.9
Number of export destinations 283 193.1 90.2 21 430 308 185.2 110.2 4 490
Number of firms 219 13233.5 15860.9 56.6 70291 65 1490.6 1379.8 93.0 4615.0
Employment 297 741640.9 1307371.0 14231 7000000 198 83580.0 94245.5 2582.0 453900.0
Output per employee, APL (real USD) 297 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.74 175 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5
Simple Avg. Appd. Tariff 201 1.9 3.6 0 18
Import-wted. Appd. Tariff 157 2.1 3.4 0 16
Simple Avg. MFN Tariff 201 2.4 4.0 0 20
Import-wted. MFN Tariff 169 2.6 4.0 0 18
No. of tariff lines 197 405.3 572.2 38 2412
Macroeconomic variables
Annual GDP growth rate (%) 326 1.1 1.8 -2 5.2 334 1.3 1.4 -0.9 3.8
Unemployment rate (%) 326 4.0 1.2 2 5.4 334 3.1 1.0 0.5 4.1
REER 326 86.7 7.3 75.0 100 334 104.9 4.0 100.0 114.4
Election year dummy 326 0.3 0.5 0 1 334 0.3 0.5 0 1
Year preceding election year dummy 326 0.3 0.4 0 1 334 0.3 0.5 0 1
UR GPA dummy 326 0.7 0.4 0 1 334 0.7 0.5 0 1
Political economy variables
~~~~~~~~~~Japan~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~Switzerland~~~~~~~~
Tariffs = 0
 
 
Source: WTO (various years); World Bank, World Development Indicators (various years); Nicita & Olarreaga 
(2006); OECD STAN (various years); OECD Trade in Services (various years); UN Comtrade (various years); 
IIDE (2009); UNIDO (2010); own calculations 
